5. Safety

First responders can be harmed by the following hazards:

• fire
• smoke
• toxic gas 
• electrical wires
• building collapse

Technologies should be developed to minimize the hazards that first responders are exposed to or minimize the harm when exposed.  Human factors methods for accident analyses (like near incident analyses) can help to learn and improve safety [1].
 

Implications for SYNERGISE:

Operators asked for unambiguous no-go/limited-go overlays with thresholds for gas, heat, and structural movement. Safety-critical alerts must pre-empt routine notifications and come with standard phrasing for radio call-outs. Near-miss logging in exercises—linked to what the UI showed and what the team did—drives rapid iteration. As ASR phases transition from assessment to extraction, the hazard profile shifts; we should design with that in mind. Inter-agency safety depends on integrating utilities and police inputs (shutoffs, cordons) into the shared COP, preventing cross-hazards like energizing a compromised block during a rescue. Borrow from high-reliability organizations: pre-task briefs with “killer questions,” standardized checkbacks on critical information, and “stop the line” authority when alarms trigger. Use post-event reviews that link alerts, actions, and outcomes to sustain vigilance without alarm fatigue. Clear ownership of safety markers (who placed, who verified) avoids diffusion of responsibility. Please standardize INSARAG-style symbols; enable quick “mark and broadcast.” Keep fail-safes (offline/store-and-forward/manual overrides) and show “last known good” states. (image here: “Hazard stack and safety-critical alert ladder”)

[1] Salmon, P. M., Stanton, N. A., Lenné, M., Jenkins, D. P., Rafferty, L., & Walker, G. H. (2017). Human factors methods and accident analysis: practical guidance and case study applications. CRC Press.